Archive for the ‘Problem of Evil’ Category.

If Evolution – No Adam, No Fall, No Salvation, No Savior

Why do atheistic evolutionists  conclude that Christianity is false? Basically, there rely on the following argument.

The Atheistic Evolutionist Argument
1) If evolution is true, there was no first, historical Adam.

2) If there was no first, historical Adam, there was no Fall.

3) If there was no Fall, the sinful condition of humanity is not an inescapable condition.

4) If the sinful condition is not an inescapable condition, moral and religious categories like ‘sin’ and ‘salvation’ are irrelevant or unnecessary, as evolution will take whatever course it takes by chance].

5) If salvation is irrelevant or unnecessary, there is no need for a Savior.

6) The heart or fundamental claim of Christianity is that it is necessary for Jesus to come as the Savior of the human race

Conclusion: If evolution is true [i.e. there was no historical Adam], then based on (5) and (6), Christianity is false.

Continue reading ‘If Evolution – No Adam, No Fall, No Salvation, No Savior’ »

A Solution to the Logical Problem (Alleged Contradiction) of Evil

The Claim of Contradiction
According to John Mackie (The Miracle of Theism. OUP 1982) the theist accepts a group or set of three propositions; this set is inconsistent. The propositions are

(1) God is omnipotent
(2) God is wholly good
and
(3) Evil exists.

Call this set A; the claim is that A is an inconsistent set. But what is it for a set to be inconsistent or contradictory? Continue reading ‘A Solution to the Logical Problem (Alleged Contradiction) of Evil’ »

The Problem of Evil and the Best of All Possible Worlds in Leibniz’s Theodicy

The Problem of Evil and the Best of All Possible Worlds in Leibniz’s Theodicy
The problem of evil is arguably the most intractable problem facing the theist. The first challenge for the theist is the logical problem of evil which says that the set of propositions comprising the following – (1) An omnipotent God creates this world, (2) God is perfectly good, (3) This world is not perfectly good, i.e. evil exists – is an inconsistent set. Holding to any two of these propositions requires dropping the third to avoid the problem of contradiction. For example, that evil exists demands either God is good but not omnipotent (since he fails to prevent evil) or that God is omnipotent but not truly good (since he allows evil despite having the power to prevent it). Continue reading ‘The Problem of Evil and the Best of All Possible Worlds in Leibniz’s Theodicy’ »